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1.  The idea of a new aestheticism is now explicit in both philosophical aesthetics and cultural 
theory with the publication of Gary Iseminger's The Aesthetic Function of Art and an 
anthology of essays edited by John Joughin and Simon Malpas critiquing the anti-aestheticism of 
literary theory.1 Both are significant in marking a wider trend reacting to, broadly speaking, 
intellectualised and historicised accounts of art, refocusing on the idea of appreciation itself, and 
working away from the emphasis on ideology and disregard for the particularity of works in, 
especially, literary theory. This broader context also includes renewed debates running within 
philosophical aesthetics about non-perceptual aesthetic properties and the aesthetic experience 
of conceptual artworks, and about beauty in art, considerations that have engaged two 
philosophers normally identified by their commitment to art theoretical and historical (and by 
extension, non-aesthetic) accounts of artistic making and viewing, namely Noël Carroll and 
Arthur Danto.2 So Carroll acknowledges that what's at stake is an aesthetic theory of art that is 
potentially 'back in business', while Danto's 'surprising' theoretic re-engagement with the 
concept of beauty has been noted by Diarmuid Costello.  
While acknowledging this background, I place this stricture on a new aestheticism: that its 
analysis and beliefs are in a developmental relation to traditional aestheticism. Iseminger relates 
1  Gary Iseminger, 'A New Aestheticism', in The Aesthetic Function of Art  (Cornell University Press, 2004); 
The New Aestheticism, eds. John Joughin and Simon Malpas (Manchester University Press, 2003). 
2  See Carroll's 'Non-perceptual Aesthetic Properties: Comments for James Shelley'; and Diarmuid Costello's 
'On Late Style: Arthur Danto's The Abuse of Beauty' (both in The British Journal of Aesthetics, 44(4), 
October 2004, pp 413-423 and pp 424-439 respectively). 
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his aestheticism to Monroe Beardsley's aesthetics and notes affinities with Victorian aestheticism 
generally; Carroll, on the other hand, proposes an account of aesthetic response which is 
'deflationary', according no special relation between art and the aesthetic, a basic tenet of any 
aestheticism worth the name.3 Clearly, if an aestheticism fails to explain this special relation, then 
accounts like Carroll's come into play, but for the purposes of this paper I limit examination of 
the aesthetic to theorising that could reasonably be said to support an aestheticism, its traditions 
and aims. 
The basic thrust of the new aestheticism in philosophical aesthetics and cultural theory is to 
defend some conception of the aesthetic as fundamental, or at least equiprimordial with other 
notions, in the theory and practice of art, thus capable of both accounting for the existence of art 
activities and supplying a distinctive methodology and phenomenology of art making and 
appreciating. In what follows I present and criticise Iseminger's new aestheticism, concluding 
that the aestheticism it delivers is too narrowly focused on artistic modes of production and 
reception. I then note the broader aesthetic considerations characteristic of pragmatist aesthetics 
in John Dewey and Richard Shusterman, contrasting their life-centred accounts of the aesthetic 
with Iseminger's art-centred one, before suggesting a new aestheticism that might synthesise 
these approaches around the notion of 'good work'.  
 
2.  Iseminger seeks to establish his new aestheticism in the context of debates in analytical 
aesthetics, particularly those around the definition and value of art, rather than in direct relation 
to cultural movements associated with the 'Victorian Aestheticism' of Walter Pater and Oscar 
Wilde.4 Specifically, Iseminger's new aestheticism is developed from the aesthetic theory of 
Monroe Beardsley. Beardsley defined art aesthetically, and characterised the aesthetic as an 
exhilarating, integrated, free and non-practical delight felt in the presence of an object when 
experienced correctly.5 Iseminger identifies functional and valuational theses here, namely that a 
3  See, for example, Carroll's 'Four Concepts of Aesthetic Experience' in Beyond Aesthetics (Cambridge U.P., 
2001). 
4  Iseminger, p.4. 
5  See 'An Aesthetic Definition of Art', for example, in Hugh Cartier (ed.) What is Art? (Haven Publications, 
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work of art is so by intending to function to afford aesthetic experience (the functional thesis, F) 
and is good if it does have that capacity (the valuational thesis, V) – and he calls this traditional 
aestheticism. His new aestheticism reckons to improve on the traditional, Beardsleyan version 
by meeting objections to it while retaining what are taken as some incontrovertible intuitions 
about art and the aesthetic and their relation that warrant, indeed demand, some kind of 
philosophical aestheticism. Iseminger identifies a number of objections, mainly antiessentialist 
and antipsychological. The intuitions are about the special link between art and the aesthetic, 
and about the necessity of experience for appreciation. Iseminger's project is to 'explain and 
defend a new version of aestheticism that aims to honor the intuitions and avoid the objections'.6 
The new functional and valuational theses designed to achieve this are: 
 
(F') The function of the artworld and practice of art is to promote aesthetic communication. 
(V') A work of art is a good work of art to the extent that it has the capacity to afford 
appreciation.7 
 
The fundamental antiessentialist objection to aestheticism is that, traditionally, it defines art 
aesthetically, but that no necessary and sufficient conditions can be given for something to be a 
work of art (aesthetic conditions or otherwise) since art by its very nature is 'expansive, 
adventurous and novel'. More specifically, antiessentialism claims support from the existence of 
supposedly non-aesthetic works of art, thus the omnipresence of Duchamp's works in 
philosophical aesthetics, and from what Iseminger calls 'hyperaesthetic' art, namely art with 
religious or political aims. Iseminger supports this objection against traditional aestheticism but 
claims his functional thesis F' makes no essentialist claim about art. He also argues F' embraces 
the historicism and institutionalism that lies behind the objection by incorporating the social 
institution or practice called the artworld.  
1983), pp 15-29; reprinted in Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, eds., Aesthetics and the Philosophy 
of Art: The Analytic Tradition: An Anthology (Blackwell, 2003). 
6  Iseminger, p.22. 
7  Iseminger, p.23. 
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The antipsychological objection to aestheticism is sceptical about the existence of a 
distinctive aesthetic emotion or experience or state of mind, or at least doubts it is an experience 
exclusive to art. It centres on the apparent lack of distinctiveness of characterisations of the 
aesthetic, concluding that aesthetic experience is a myth and/or that it must fail to do the art 
definitional work aestheticism demands of it. George Dickie has famously criticised attempts to 
isolate a special aesthetic attitude of 'distancing' or 'disinterest', arguing that appropriate 
responses to artworks are cases of 'paying attention' to them rather than indicative of a special 
attitude of putting aside or distancing oneself from private and practical concerns.8 Additionally, 
even assuming a distinct aesthetic experience, Duchamp's works cut here too, since along with 
other conceptual works (and political and religious works too), so the argument goes, they have 
properties that are totally independent of any characterisation of aesthetic experience. Iseminger 
argues that his new aestheticism does not fall to the antipsychological  objection because V' 
contains a new idea of the aesthetic state of mind called 'appreciation' which can be unpacked in 
a way which is not suspect like the notion of aesthetic 'disinterest', and is sufficiently rich to 
account for supposedly antiaesthetic art like Duchamp's and political art like Brecht's.  
             
3.  Clearly, the success or otherwise of Iseminger's project hangs on his account of appreciation 
(and its relations with the aesthetic and with art). He defines it as 'finding the experiencing of a 
state of affairs to be valuable in itself'.9 'Experiencing a state of affairs' is further explained as a 
direct knowledge that the state of affairs is the case; it can be sensory but is not merely so, 
involving as it does conceptual capacities and possibly prior knowledge; and 'experiencing' 
involves getting it right – thus Iseminger calls the concept an epistemic one. To find something 
'valuable in itself' is characterised as thinking a state of affairs is good, rather than just liking it, 
and so making a claim on other people that they to ought to think the same; it contrasts too with 
finding something instrumentally valuable, as a mere means to some other valued end. So in 
appreciation as a whole, one knows a state of affairs to be the case and believes the experience 
8  George Dickie, 'The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude', American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964), pp.65-65. 
9  Iseminger, p.36. 
24 
JEFFREY PETTS 
of it to be valuable in itself.  
Having conceded to the antiessentialist about art, Iseminger challenges the antiessentialist to 
say what is wrong with his admitted essentialism about appreciation. Similarly, he defends his 
'appreciation' against the antipsychological objection by appealing to its congruity with the facts 
of finding experiencing valuable in itself: so the claim is that it is not a myth but a fact of human 
existence. Iseminger rightly notes too that there remains the question of whether his account of 
appreciation can be rightly labelled 'aesthetic'. His appeal is to the proposed paradigm case of 
aesthetic communication, which stated in its most general form is someone designing and making 
something to be appreciated by somebody else. And it is this which the artworld functions to 
promote. 
So is appreciation like this and how is it essentially aesthetic? The question is particularly 
apposite for Iseminger, given it is a notion which is familiar and comfortable in non-aesthetic 
theories of art, and Iseminger's stated project to honour certain aesthetic intuitions as well as 
meet objections.  
 
4.  Iseminger takes a limited set of what he calls 'aestheticist intuitions' as a touchstone of 
aestheticism, listing four, all of which contain art as a key term. So there is said to be an intuition 
about 1) a close connection between art and the aesthetic; 2) that experiencing an artwork is 
necessary for appreciating it; 3) that there is a distinction between artistically relevant and 
irrelevant properties; and 4) that the criterion of artistic value follows from the nature of art.10 It 
might as easily and correctly be said that these are intuitions about art, and nor are they 
propositions that if true commit us to aestheticism. For instance, these intuitions could be 
honoured by an art theory committed to artistic intention and critical retrieval by audiences, 
which characterised these without any reference to the 'look and feel' of works. If this would 
indeed be stipulative, then it properly suggests that intuitions about the aesthetic are somewhat 
different from Iseminger's aestheticist intuitions. Aestheticism can, and does, (and must) feed off 
intuitions that are not exclusively about art – so we see that intuitions about the aesthetic, 
10  Iseminger, p.10. 
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reflected in ordinary language use, are about an experience that is felt, immediate, non-
mediated, pleasurable and whole. Iseminger rejects this phenomenological approach, but does 
recognise that some independent account of the aesthetic is necessary if the aestheticist intuitions 
are to be genuinely aesthetic, so that there is indeed something to be called aestheticism.  
His notion of appreciation simpliciter is meant to supply this (in Iseminger's words, it is meant 
to be a means of 'breaking into aesthetic space'). It consists of appreciating a state of affairs, so 
that, formally, one finds experiencing x's being F to be valuable in itself; Iseminger offers the 
example of finding the gracefulness of a spheroid to be valuable in itself. But what is happening 
in the example? Firstly, the shape of a thing has been identified (a spheroid); and an aesthetic 
judgement has been made, that the spheroid-shaped thing is graceful. Moreover, that 
experience has been valued in itself. Clearly this mode of appreciation contrasts with, say, 
appreciating the speed of my broadband internet connection – my judgement here does not 
involve any aesthetic concepts like gracefulness; and I experience the speed but I do not value 
the experience of it in itself, but rather because of the function it performs, namely faster 
downloads. The problem for Iseminger is that, although different types of appreciation are 
acknowledged, the case that appreciation has been defined simpliciter and independently of the 
aesthetic appears dubious since 'experiencing x is F as valuable in itself' introduces distinctively 
aesthetic notions (experiencing value, non-functional value). Also, the example of appreciating 
the spheroid, easily contrasted with other appreciations, introduces aesthetic predication (and 
by extension, non-aesthetic). So the clause 'x is F' is, and should properly be, complicated by 
considerations of aesthetic and non-aesthetic concepts, thus asking, for example, what makes 
'graceful' aesthetic? And the attributive and predicative application of aesthetic concepts needs 
consideration too: so is the spheroid a graceful spheroid or graceful tout court? In other words, 
the account of appreciation simpliciter imports but does not properly acknowledge or expound 
aesthetic notions; it is not 'simpliciter', but then nor is it sufficiently granular to be recast as an 
account of aesthetic appreciation.  
But, in any case, Iseminger identifies the aesthetic as a particular kind of transaction around 
appreciation, so that it is the intentional actions of people to design and make things for 
appreciation, and that are appreciated, that properly constitutes an 'aesthetic communication'. 
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This account of the aesthetic is intended to show it prior to and independent of art and thus 
justify some kind of claim to aestheticism. It is axiomatic that we can describe making artefacts 
independently of artistic making (think of basic tool making). But does the same apply to making 
artefacts for appreciation, and that are in fact appreciated (the kind of appreciation of 
intentionally graceful spheroids rather than of a technologically advanced internet connection)? It 
would seem, rather, that making for appreciation is already a complex affair in which makers 
must be aware of the likely appreciative responses of their audiences, who in turn have 
knowledge of makers' intentions and products. It is argued, reasonably, that 'making special' 
and taking a delight in beautiful objects are basic to the human condition; but their nexus in 
intentional making for aesthetic response is paradigmatic, I would suggest, of art and not, as 
Iseminger, argues, the aesthetic ('aesthetic communication'). This distinction has a theoretic and 
practical significance, given that Iseminger concludes a functional thesis F' for new aestheticism 
in which the artworld, rather than activities of making and appreciating themselves, promote 
aesthetic experience. Artworld institutions put the means in place, perhaps, for artists and 
spectators alike to experience art (so Arts Council England funds artists to carry out their work 
and offers loans for people to buy and view art for themselves), but clearly works themselves 
engage us experientially. Iseminger would hardly deny this, but then why introduce the notion of 
the artworld per se promoting aesthetic experience? The problem remains even if the notion is 
loosely conceived around 'artists', since the functional thesis F' then states only that artists 
promote art (if the argument is correct that 'aesthetic communication', in Iseminger's formulation, 
is in fact a description of art). Artworld functioning, like Arts Council England's (or in extremis, 
state-controlled artworlds like those in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia), is contingent on 
many social and political factors, and aestheticism traditionally recognises this, bracketing 
artworld activities off from the natural bases of aesthetic experience. We see this especially in 
Deweyan aesthetics, and also in Marxist and feminist formulations.11  
In summary, Iseminger's new aestheticism as formulated in theses F' and V' is suspect in 
11  I look at the Deweyan approach in sections 5 and 6 below. For introductions to the latter, see Stefan 
Morawaski's 'Introduction' to Marx and Engels on Literature and Art (International General, 1977), and 
Mary Devereaux's 'Feminist Aesthetics' in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics (OUP, 2003). 
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three main areas. 1) Its 'aestheticist intuitions' are too narrowly construed from the outset, 
exclusively focused on art considerations and failing to address a wider set of aesthetic 
intuitions, familiar for instance in ordinary language use of 'aesthetic'. 2) It fails to deliver an 
account or characterisation of the aesthetic per se, its 'aesthetic communication' around 
'appreciation' paradigmatic of artistic modes of production and reception. It therefore fails to 
address the antipsychological objection raised by Dickie that there is not a distinctive aesthetic 
experience. 3) The notion of artworlds functioning to promote 'aesthetic communication' seems 
untenable given their social contingency; and if 'aesthetic communication' is exclusively artistic, 
then the functional thesis F' ceases to be an aesthetic one. In conclusion, we need to look 
elsewhere for the genuinely aesthetic considerations necessary for a new aestheticism. 
 
5.  For Dewey 'the actual work of art is what the product does with and in experience'.12 
Experience proper is characterised as an aesthetic experience, an interaction in which a human 
being naturally engages some part of their environment to a felt and satisfactory conclusion that 
allows it to be recalled and discussed as such. The key driver in Dewey's thinking is establishing 
the continuity of 'normal process of living', of ordinary human functioning, with art; so that to 
conceive of 'art as experience' is to witness art as experience at its most intense, as an 
interaction at root like all others between a human organism and its environment in so far as it 
involves effort and undergoing, but especially vital in so far as both artists and spectators alike 
spend their efforts to a consummatory moment of felt satisfaction. Furthermore, such 
experiences stand out by modifying experiencers; they are said, by Dewey, to 'energise and 
inspire'. Shusterman notes this privileging of experience over the object (the work of art) and 
Dewey's identification of the essence and value of art in 'the dynamic and developing 
experiential activity through which they are created and perceived'.13  
Dewey's aesthetic theory postdates by a decade or so Duchamp's Fountain, but there is no 
mention of it or any other of his works. Fountain is often cast by opponents as the nemesis of 
12  John Dewey, Art as Experience (Perigree, 1980), p.3. 
13  Richard Shusterman, 'Pragmatism: Dewey', in Routledge Companion to Aesthetics (2001), p.102. 
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aesthetic theory, but Dewey's proposition that an artwork is essentially the experience of it does 
not a priori rule out conceptual works for aesthetic theory, given that his characterisation of 
experience does not stipulate the proper objects of that experience. If, however, we trade in 
deflationary versions of aesthetic experience, tending to narrowly identify the aesthetic with the 
concept of beauty, and beauty with perceptual form, and thus aesthetic appreciation of art with 
formalism, then works like Fountain are problematic. It seems, in this schema, that if 
conceptual works really are artworks, they are only explicable as such in non-aesthetic ways 
(they are not formally beautiful). Dewey's broader naturalistic account of the aesthetic at least 
suggests a way in which conceptual art can be aesthetically appreciated in making and viewing. 
So, the maker repudiates the state of contemporary art and places a urinal in an art gallery; we 
are aware of the existence of Fountain, its maker and making, and make our judgement on it: in 
both cases, there is a felt sense of an action done to completion that can be publicly and 
critically assessed, there is 'an experience'. In short, there is, therefore, no counter-argument in 
conceptual artworks, since these too have experiential effects. The same goes for so-called 
'disruptive' artworks, which might be experienced as disturbing or perplexing. However, the real 
issue with Carroll and Danto (who can concede aesthetic qualities in conceptual artworks 
without necessarily abandoning non-aesthetic theories of art) is about all art being essentially or 
necessarily aesthetic, both denying that artworks are primarily aesthetic. While Iseminger's art-
centred aestheticism falters here (with 'aesthetic communication' seemingly trapped in an 
artistic/artworld paradigm), Deweyan responses look outside of artworlds to the natural roots of 
artistic behaviours, to the notion of 'an experience'. But can this 'experience' support definitional 
conditions for arthood, or supply some 'special relation' between art and the aesthetic, thus 
warranting aestheticism?  
Shusterman argues that confusion follows if Dewey's account of aesthetic experience is made 
definitional of art. It follows because the historically determined concept of art cannot be 
reshaped to the extent that it is coextensive with Deweyan aesthetic experience; so, for 
example, however powerful the aesthetic experience of sunsets, they are not going to be 
reclassified as art. Robert Stecker sums this point up by suggesting that the 'pervasiveness of the 
aesthetic outside of art per se' always ultimately prevents it being a sufficient condition for being 
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an artwork.14 Still, Shusterman continues that aesthetic experience is a general background 
condition for art; it is necessary for art's existence, and this condition concerns the point rather 
then the extension of the concept of art.15 Shusterman identifies the 'end of aesthetic experience' 
with Danto's rejection of it on the grounds that it fails to demarcate art. But, he continues, its 
redemption lies in the Deweyan tradition that recognises the 'transformational', rather than 
demarcational or definitional, aspect of aesthetic experience. In other words, aesthetic 
experience is an important concept because it directs us to the experience itself, and to an 
experience, moreover, that is worth having, indeed is life affirming. If Iseminger's aestheticism is 
epistemic and art-centred, its aesthetic intuitions driven by considerations of art and its proper 
appreciation, and the operation of artworlds, then Dewey and Shusterman offer a broader life-
centred view, in which a greater emphasis is given to the phenomenology of experience per se, 
particularly its somatic features, which Dewey signifies with his primary interest in the aesthetic 
behaviour of the 'live creature'.16  
 
6.  If Carroll and Danto now acknowledge that a distinctive aesthetic response to art exists and 
is one kind of appropriate response, but only one and without primacy, where does this leave an 
aestheticism, either like Iseminger's or Shusterman's, that reciprocally acknowledges that 
aesthetic experience fails the art demarcation test? Despite marking an end to the moratorium on 
aesthetic experience, there is little suggestion of substantive shared ground. Carroll's deflationary 
account of aesthetic experience excludes 'interpretive play' as an aesthetic interaction with art 
(and marks this exclusion as a fatal flaw in any aestheticism), while 'new aestheticism' and a 
pragmatic approach like Dewey's, for instance, can still suggest interpretation is properly 
expressed in a felt sense of (dis)liking, characterising the whole as aesthetic. Also, Carroll's 
'narrative' approach to identifying artworks, whereby artworks are identified by their relation to 
the canon of existing artworks, tends to discount the expectation of artists and spectators in 
making and viewing art that works are valuable and experientially powerful, and that it is this 
14  Robert Stecker, 'Definition of Art', in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics (OUP, 2003), p.143. 
15  Richard Shusterman, The End of Aesthetic Experience, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 55:1, 1997. 
16  Chapter One of Dewey's Art as Experience is titled 'The Live Creature'. 
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potentiality that motivates their creation and viewing.17 Both Iseminger and Shusterman, unlike 
Carroll, note similar necessary background conditions of art. Behind these differences, the 
thought operating on the aestheticist side is that the sources of art are the pleasures of making 
and viewing in themselves. Iseminger puts faith in the 'persistence of aesthetic communication' 
and in the necessary existence of artworld practices functioning to support it, while Shusterman 
tends to hedonism and a permissiveness about art.18 But a further direction for aestheticism, 
following its traditions, is also indicated by this thought – one that emphasises pleasure in, and 
the whole process of, work.  
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century Arts and Crafts movement embodies the 
work-centred view of the aesthetic, with its emphasis on the manner in which artefacts generally, 
including artworks, are produced (and by extension, appreciated). Only artefacts produced in 
an appropriate manner are capable of being art. Calling it 'useful labour', William Morris 
identified three elements, namely producing a product worth having, pleasure in making, and the 
hope of rest after labour.19 Dewey makes a similar point when he suggests that the full 
participation of workers in the production and disposition of their products is a determining 
element in the aesthetic quality of the experience of things produced.20 These features provide 
the basic structure of an aesthetic notion of good work. But no doubt a sophisticated 
aestheticism, if fully developed, synthesises all the art, life and work aspects of the aesthetic; and 
in so doing, it would honour a fuller range of aesthetic intuitions than Iseminger's new 
aestheticism. In such a schema, the work of art, that structure of good work in production and 
reception that art exemplifies, is the ground of an aestheticism that properly explains the art and 
life aspects of the aesthetic. This aestheticism is universal and moral, antithetical to the Western, 
fine art Artworld and understanding the aesthetic as at the core of human endeavour and 
flourishing. Its direction indicates the (re)construction of societies around aesthetic modes of 
17  Noel Carroll, 'Art, History and Narrative', in Beyond Aesthetics (Cambridge U.P., 2001). 
18  Iseminger, p.137. And Shusterman has recently talked of the potential for sexual behaviour to be 
aesthetic: 'In search of aesthetic experience', London Graduate Conference, 11 June 2004, University of 
London; and he has defended some popular culture's claims to art status.  
19  William Morris, 'Useful Work versus Useless Toil', The Collected Works, Vol. 23 (Russell and Russell, 
1966). 
20  Dewey, p.343. 
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production and reception rather than, as in Iseminger's more limited construct, aesthetic 
communication's promotion through the functioning of artworlds.  
 
